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This article illustrates the complexity of women’s engagement 
in armed groups, through the example of women involved in the 
rebellion in Ivory Coast between 2002 and 2011. It provides an 
analysis of the trajectories of women enrolled in the conflict in 
Ivory Coast in various regions and during various periods of the 
rebellion. 
How were women involved in the conflict in Ivory Coast? 
What motives led them to become involved in the rebellion and, 
once they had become involved, what activities did they engage in? 
How might one compare their experience in the rebellion to that of 
men?
“I’m telling you, don’t only look at those who were fighting at our side, but also 
those who prepared [the food] they were fighting like that, because if us, we 
didn’t eat, no way we can go to the front. Some other women, it’s while bring-
ing us water that they fell.1”
This excerpt from an interview with the President of an organization of Ivorian 
ex-fighters testifies to the diversity of profiles among women described as 
ex-fighters2 in the context of the Ivorian conflict. In Ivory Coast, women ex-fight-
ers3, especially fighters within the rebellion, are distinct from fighters in other 
conflicts in which women in charge of “auxiliary” activities (cooking, cleaning…) 
are considered as “associates”4, and not as fully-fledged fighters. This article, 
based on life histories of women collected in Ivory Coast between 2014 and 2015, 
seeks to shed light on the various logics according to which Ivorian women fight-
ers got involved in the rebellion between 2002 and 2011, by contrasting these 
with those of men.
Ivory Coast fell into the throes of socio-political troubles from the early 1990s. 
It gradually fell into a cycle that saw violence insinuate itself into the heart of 
social, economic and political relations. Over the course of more than a decade, 
the country endured a series of politico-military crises, against the background 
of a deep challenge to national identity and citizenship. The early 1990s were 
marked, first by a succession of crises, then by the change in power following 
the death of Félix Houphouët Boigny in 1993. The President of the National 
Assembly, Henry Konan Bédié, the constitutional successor, then introduced the 
concept of ivoirité (Ivoirity, Ivorian-ness,)5 bringing about a debate over identity 
1. Interview with the President of the Association for the Demobilized in Ivory Coast, 11 Sep-
tember 2014, Abidjan.
2. “Ex-fighters” (ex-combattants) is, in the Ivorian context, the accepted term to refer to those 
who fought during the Ivorian crisis of 2002-2011. 
3. According to the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (ADDR), wo-
men made up approximately 10% of the total number of Ivorian fighters.
4. See the definition by the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Rein-
sertion (CONADER) in the framework of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
5. See « L’ivoirité, ou l’esprit du nouveau contrat social du Président H. K. Bédié ». (extraits) », 
Politique africaine, vol. 78, no. 2, 2000, pp. 65-69.  DOZON, Jean-Pierre. « La Côte d’ivoire entre 
démocratie, nationalisme et ethnonationalisme », Politique africaine, vol. 78, no. 2, 2000, pp. 
45-62.  DEMBELE, Ousmane. « Côte d’Ivoire : la fracture communautaire », Politique africaine, 
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The concept of ivoirité was especially directed at Alassane 
Ouattara, Henry Konan Bédié’s potential political rival for 
the presidential elections of 1995. Alassane Ouattara came 
from the North of the country. He was suspected of being 
of “dubious nationality”; his father was accused of being of 
Voltaic (burkinabé) origin. The questions of identity and 
ivoirité were set at the heart of social and political rela-
tions in Ivory Coast. This led to stigmatizing and margin-
alizing inhabitants of the North. These became considered 
foreigners and/or second-class Ivorians by Ivorians from 
the South, purported to be “real” Ivorians. In 1999, a first 
coup led by General Gueï put an end to a period of stability. 
Laurent Gbagbo, who came to power in 2000 following an 
electoral process from which Alassane Ouattara was again 
excluded6, continued and intensified the politics of ivoirité. 
vol. 89, no. 1, 2003, pp. 34-48.
6. In 1995, Alassane Ouattara had been excluded following a revision 
of the Electoral Code that stipulated that candidates for the presiden-
On September 19th, 2002, an 
attempted coup led by sections of 
the military who refused the demo-
bilization process7 became a rebel-
lion and led to the country’s split 
into two distinct entities: a North-
ern zone controlled by the “rebels”, 
who were dubbed Forces Nouvelles 
(“New Forces”), and a zone in the 
South and West that remained under 
the control of Laurent Gbagbo’s gov-
ernment. The rebellion included the 
members of the various insurgent 
movements founded in 2002 (Mou-
vement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire 
(Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast,) 
Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du 
Grand Ouest (Popular Movement of 
the Greater West,) and Mouvement 
pour la Justice et la Paix (Movement 
for Justice and Peace)). These united 
to form the Forces Nouvelles de Côte 
d’Ivoire and in particular its armed 
wing, the Forces Armées des Forces 
Nouvelles (FAFN). 
This period was marked by several 
attempts to resolve the crisis. In 2007, 
the Ouagadougou Political Agreement 
enabled the resumption of political 
dialogue between the two belligerent 
parties. The armed groups on each side then began the 
process of disarming and demobilizing their fighters. In 
2010, the presidential election that saw Alassane Ouattara8 
tial election had to be “born to a mother and father who were both 
Ivorian at birth.” In 2000, the revision of Article 35 of the Constitu-
tion on this same point was approved by a referendum. See also 
Human Rights Watch, « Le Nouveau Racisme, La manipulation poli-
tique de l’ethnicité en Côte d’Ivoire », August 28, 2001 (https://www.
hrw.org/fr/report/2001/08/28/le-nouveau-racisme/la-manipulation-poli-
tique-de-lethnicite-en-cote-divoire).
7. See Banégas, Richard, and Bruno Losch. « La Côte d’Ivoire au bord 
de l’implosion », Politique africaine, vol. 87, no. 3, 2002, p. 142. The 
authors emit various hypotheses concerning the origins of the mutiny: 
“In this eminently complex situation, among the most plausible hypo-
theses are that various interest groups and political factions exploited 
structural discontent among the military, or that simultaneous and 
rival plots collided. In other words, this was a coup whose spark was 
dual, if not triple.”
8. Following the Marcoussis Accords and Accra III, the National Assem-
bly voted to revise Article 35 of the Constitution. In order to be eligible 
for the presidential election, candidates now had to be “born to either 
a father or a mother who was born Ivorian.”
4compete with Laurent Gbagbo was followed by a violent 
post-election crisis, after the announced results were chal-
lenged by both sides. During this crisis, the protagonists 
again took up arms. The rebels of the FAFN were supported 
by young men and women from Abidjan of Northern origin, 
who lent their support to Alassane Ouattara to fight the loy-
alist forces that supported Laurent Gbagbo. After over five 
months of fighting, Gbagbo was arrested and transferred 
to the International Criminal Court, and Alassane Ouattara 
was sworn in as head of state. Throughout the crisis, both 
sides clashed violently, leading to over 3,000 deaths. 
WOMEN’S 
LIFE-TRAJECTORIES 
BEFORE JOINING 
THE REBELLION
What place did women fighters in the rebel camp hold in 
this long-term conflict? Even while the ex-fighters inter-
viewed had diverse social trajectories prior to the conflict, a 
certain homogeneity emerges from their personal histories 
according to the period, the group and the region in which 
they became involved.
Seven women whom I encountered in Bouaké— the strong-
hold of the rebellion—dubbed themselves the “Amazons”9. 
These were aged between 35 and 52 at the outset of the 
crisis in 2002, were mainly housewives, had little school-
ing (primary school), and exercised various trade activi-
ties. They all belonged to the Dioula community, from the 
Mandé ethnic group, a trading community10 highly active 
in the region. They also had in common that at least one 
member of their families (primarily men) had joined the 
rebellion before they did.
In Abidjan, the second group that I met was made up of four 
women who were involved during the post-election crisis of 
2011. These were between 25 and 30 when they enrolled, 
and all of them had at least a BEPC (middle school degree), 
or even a Baccalaureate (high school degree). Three of them 
were university students before they joined the group; the 
fourth was a trader. All were unmarried before they joined; 
9. This refers to the “Amazons” of the Kingdom of Dahomey, renowned 
as valiant warriors.
10. See N. Ouattara, Les commerçants dyula en Côte d’Ivoire, per-
manences et ruptures d’un milieu socio-professionnel, École normale 
supérieure d’Abidjan, Abidjan, 1987.
one is now a widow, and another separated from her 
partner after and because she joined the rebellion.
As for the male component of the rebellion, according to an 
ADDR officer “many of them worked in informal trading, 
small traders, that kind of things. There weren’t many 
who had degrees. Those are more the ones who joined the 
movement in 2011 during the post-election crisis. Right: 
it’s then that urban youth who had a BEPC or the bac [Bac-
calaureate] took up arms11”. These differences are notably 
explained by the fact that the youth who joined the rebel-
lion from 2002 hailed primarily from rural areas with low 
schooling rates. During the post-election crisis, however, 
those who joined the rebellion lived in Abidjan, the eco-
nomic capital of Ivory Coast, which gathers most of the 
country’s students in both schools and universities.
DIVERSE MOTIVES 
FOR JOINING, 
FROM “AN COMMITMENT 
TO PEACE” TO HOPES 
OF REWARDS
Among both men and women, justifications for joining 
the rebellion were articulated around three broad axes: 
identity, material needs and security12. From 2002, the 
enrolment of youth in the rebel-held zone was broad and 
volunteer-based. Both women and men primarily put 
forward arguments invoking defence of the nation and 
the homeland, as well as a return to peace. During the 
1990s, communities in the North had been excluded and 
stigmatized, in the framework of the nationalist policy of 
ivoirité set up by the various governments of the time. In 
response to various attempts to evict them that they had 
to confront, these communities developed a relation-
ship of mistrust towards the nation and the homeland. 
Hence, as the “Amazons” explained: “OK, so we fought 
for peace and freedom… Because at that time Ivory Coast 
was divided in two, where it was said that the Northerners 
were Burkinabés and that the Southerners were the real 
Ivorians… So I think that that’s what led people to take 
11. Interview with an ADDR officer, July 2nd, 2014, Abidjan.
12. See Moussa FOFANA, Les déterminants de l’enrôlement des jeunes 
combattants de la rébellion du Nord de la Côte d’Ivoire, Oxford, Crise 
Working Paper, February 2008
5up arms13”. This also illustrates women’s appropriation of 
the rebels’ discourse in order to legitimate their becoming 
involved within the movement. 
Further, the crisis provoked an economic slowdown and 
prompted a rise in criminality, especially in the rebel-
held zone, which directly affected the trading that was the 
primary means of subsistence for these unmarried women 
or isolated housewives. The loss of income was also a key 
motive for some of them to become involved in the rebel-
lion. The same economic argument was put forward by 
men to justify their involvement in the crisis that broke out 
in 2002.
As for men and women who were involved in the post-elec-
tion crisis, among the primary reasons for their involve-
ment was the hope of finding stable employment in gov-
ernment administration, quasi-public services, security 
forces, the army or paramilitary bodies when the crisis 
ended. The same perspective motivated a certain number 
of women, as the following testimony from an ex-fighter 
confirms: “When we enrolled, we were told that we were 
going to be in the army, that we would get military IDs”. 
The hope of acquiring employment through the rebellion 
derived from the concrete promises of warlords, the prece-
dent of the promotion and integration of rebels within the 
army following the Ouagadougou Political Agreement of 
2007, and/or, more generally, the prospect of programs to 
reintegrate ex-fighters set up within the framework of DDR 
programs. Such strategies generally relied upon a swift 
outcome to the post-election crisis.
Finally, it must be specified that some women who joined 
the rebels previously belonged to pro-Gbagbo groups, in 
particular to self-defence groups, while others made the 
reverse transition. Those were mostly cooks who joined 
these groups for motives more economic than ideological. 
They went wherever work, living and pay conditions were 
most advantageous.
All women ex-fighters also put forward a security-based 
argument. Enrolment in an armed group guaranteed them 
a significant means of protection in a context where danger 
was omnipresent.
Finally, a social mimetic effect was also witnessed, whereby 
men and women joined the rebellion voluntarily after they 
saw those close to them join the movement, whether these 
were friends, family members, neighbours or partners.
13. Interview with a Bouaké Amazon, July 14th, 2014, Bouaké.
BEING A WOMAN IN THE 
REBELLION 
Women who joined the rebellion generally did so for reason 
similar to those of men. Their experience and their position 
within the rebellion, however, distinguish them from their 
male counterparts. Like them, they took up various posi-
tions. Indeed, the rebels were proud to lay claim to the pres-
ence of women among them. As opposed to men, however, 
all the women who were interviewed stated that they 
had primarily occupied auxiliary positions: as cooks and 
nurses, or hiding weapons and food and smuggling them 
between the loyalist and the rebel zones. None of them had 
held a command position, and only one stated that she had 
handled weapons and taken part in clashes—an Amazon 
whose companions dubbed her “the warrior”. Such state-
ments should, however, be taken cautiously, since these 
women, by characterizing themselves as “auxiliaries”, may 
have been seeking to avoid becoming implicated in poten-
tial crimes, and/or falling prey to reprisals. This may also 
have been a tactic that enabled them to remain within the 
role ascribed them by society. Even if, by joining a violent 
male milieu, they had deviated from the traditional path 
assigned to them, remaining in the kitchen—for example—
allowed them to show that this deviation had been only 
partial. Their participation in the conflict did not therefore 
lead to a true transformation of social gender relations, 
and, for most of them, the return to peace involved a return 
to the status quo. Worse still, their status as ex-fighters 
inflicted on some of these women a stigma derived from 
their deviance. The benefits derived from their engagement 
in the rebellion (financial autonomy, and a partial eman-
cipation from socio-cultural codes) do not appear to have 
become translated into political or social power, or into a 
means of social change at all.
Finally, the development of conflict dynamics between 
2002 and 2011 influenced the experience of women within 
the rebellion. The experiences of women within the rebel-
lion differ according to the time and place when they joined. 
Women who fought in Abidjan during the post-election 
crisis lived in the camp, and had separate quarters. They 
were subject to the same military rules as men were, in 
particular to monitoring of their movements between the 
camp and the outside that required exit permits, and had 
been given basic military training alongside men. By con-
trast, the Bouaké “Amazons” did not live in the camps, and 
returned home after their day’s work. This difference illus-
trates the rebellion’s adaptation to the changing dynamics 
of the conflict, from a period in which the rebels controlled 
the conflict zone and could let women move freely between 
6the camp and their homes, to a post-election crisis period 
during which they did not control the territory (Abidjan) 
and therefore had to limit movements between the camp 
and the outside.
REBEL MEN, 
REBEL WOMEN: 
A COMMON CAUSE?
The individual life histories of women fighters, and their 
motives for joining the rebellion, are, then, ultimately very 
similar to those of men who joined the rebellion. As such, 
the differences between ex-fighters appear to rest more 
upon the time and place at which they joined than upon 
gender. Women who joined from 2002 had very distinct 
trajectories from those who joined during the post-election 
crisis, whether in terms of age-group, educational level or 
professional activity.
Furthermore, the participation of Ivorian women in the 
conflict provides data concerning the various dynamics 
that spanned the conflict and the Ivorian rebellion. This 
participation cannot, however, be considered as an indica-
tor of social change with respect to women. Even though 
some were able to challenge their condition by virtue of 
their involvement in the rebel movement, the positions 
which they occupied during the conflict were auxiliary 
ones, identical to those which they generally occupied in 
society (cooking, cleaning…). Their involvement there-
fore falls under the rubric of a kind of partial emancipa-
tion, since the sexual division of labour within the various 
groups was sustained. In the Ivorian post-conflict context, 
these women, no less so than men, felt stigmatized due to 
their involvement in an armed group. 
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